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Gayle Greene
It is one of the marvels of our time that the
nuclear  industry  managed  to  resurrect  itself
from its ruins at the end of the last century,
when it crumbled under its costs, inefficiencies,
and  mega-accidents.  Chernobyl  released
hundreds  of  times  the  radioactivity  of  the
Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki  bombs  combined,
contaminating more than 40% of Europe and
the  entire  Northern  Hemisphere.1  But  along
came the nuclear lobby to breathe new life into
the industry, passing off as “clean” this energy
source that polluted half the globe. The “fresh
look at nuclear”—in the words of a New York
Times makeover piece (May 13, 2006)2—paved
the  way  to  a  “nuclear  Renaissance”  in  the
United States that Fukushima has by no means
brought to a halt.
That  mainstream  media  have  been  powerful
advocates  for  nuclear  power  comes  as  no
surprise.  “The  media  are  saturated  with  a
skilled,  intensive,  and  effective  advocacy
campaign by the nuclear industry, resulting in
disinformation”  and  “wholly  counterfactual
accounts…widely  believed  by  otherwise
sensible people,” states the 2010-2011 World
Nuclear Industry Status Report by Worldwatch
Institute.3 What is less well understood is the
nature of the “evidence” that gives the nuclear
industry its mandate, Cold War science which,
with its reassurances about low-dose radiation
risk,  is  being  used  to  quiet  alarms  about
Fukushima and to stonewall new evidence that
would call a halt to the industry.
Consider  these  damage  control  pieces  from
major media:
•  The  “miniscule  quantities”  of
radiation in the radioactive plume
spreading across the U.S. pose “no
health  hazard,”  assures  the
Department  of  Energy  (William
Broad,  “Radiation  over  U.S.  is
Harmless,  Officials  Say,”  NYT,
March  22,  2011).
• “The risk of cancer is quite low,
lower than what the public might
expect,”  explains  Evan  Douple,
head  of  the  Radiation  Effects
Research  Foundation  (RERF),
which  has  studied  the  A-bomb
survivors and found that “at very
low doses, the risk was also very
low” (Denise Grady, “Radiation is
everywhere,  but  how  to  rate
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harm?”  NYT,  April  5,  2011).
• An NPR story a few days after
the  Daiichi  reactors  destabilized
quotes  this  same  Evan  Douple
saying that radiation levels around
the plant “should be reassuring. At
these levels so far I don’t think a
study  would  be  able  to  measure
that  there  would  be  any  health
effects, even in the future.” (“Early
radiation data from near plant ease
health  fears,”  Richard  Knox  and
Andrew Prince,” March 18, 2011)
The NPR story, like Grady’s piece
(above), stresses that the Radiation
Effects  Research  Foundation  has
had  six  decades  experience
studying  the  health  effects  of
radiation,  so  it  ought  to  know.   
•  Brit ish  journal ist  George
Monbiot,  environmentalist  turned
nuclear  advocate,  in  a  much
publicized  debate  with  Helen
Caldicott on television and in the
Guardian, refers to the RERF data
as  “scientific  consensus,”  citing,
again, their reassurances that low
dose  radiation  incurs  low  cancer
risk.4
Everyone knows that radiation at high dose is
harmful,  but  the  Hiroshima  studies  reassure
that risk diminishes as dose diminishes until it
becomes negligible. This is a necessary belief if
the  nuclear  industry  is  to  exist,  because
reactors release radioactive emissions not only
in  accidents,  but  in  their  routine,  day-to-day
operations and in the waste they produce. If
low-dose radiation is not negligible, workers in
the industry are at risk, as are people who live
in the vicinity of reactors or accidents—as is all
life  on  this  planet  .  The  waste  produced by
reactors  does  not  “dilute  and  disperse”  and
disappear, as industry advocates would have us
believe, but is blown by the winds, carried by
the tides,  seeps into earth and groundwater,
and makes its way into the food chain and into
us, adding to the sum total of cancers and birth
defects throughout the world. Its legacy is for
longer than civilization has existed; plutonium,
with its half life of 24,000 years, is, in human
terms, forever.
What  is  this  Radiation  Effects  Research
Foundation, and on what “science” does it base
its reassuring claims?
*******
The  Atomic  Bomb  Casualty  Commission
(ABCC), as it was originally called, began its
studies  of  the  survivors  five  years  after  the
bombings.  (It  was  renamed  the  Radiation
Effects  Research  Foundation  in  the  mid
seventies,  to  get  the  “atomic  bomb”  out,  at
around  the  same  time  the  Atomic  Energy
Commiss ion  (AEC)  was  renamed  the
Department of Energy (DOE). Japan, which has
the distinction of  being twice nuked, first  as
our wartime enemy then in 2011 as our ally and
the recipient of our GE reactors, has also been
the  population  most  closely  studied  for
radiation-related effects, for the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki  bombings  created  a  large,  ready-
made population of radiation-exposed humans.
“Ah, but the Americans—they are wonderful,”
exclaimed  Japan’s  radiation  expert  Tsuzuki
Masao,  who  lamented  that  he’d  had  only
rabbits to work on: “It has remained for them
to conduct the human experiment!”5
The ABCC studied but did not treat radiation
effects, and many survivors were reluctant to
identify  themselves  as  survivors,  having  no
wish  to  bare  their  health  problems  to  US
investigators and become mired in bureaucracy
and social stigma. But sufficient numbers did
voluntarily  come  forth  to  make  this  the
largest—and longest—study of radiation-related
health effects ever. No medical study has had
such  resources  lavished  on  it,  teams  of
 APJ | JF 10 | 1 | 3
3
scientists, state of the art equipment: this was
Atomic  Energy  Commission  (AEC)  funding.
Since it  is  assumed in epidemiology that the
larger the sample,  the greater  the statistical
accuracy, there has been a tendency to accept
these data as  the gold standard of  radiation
risk.  
ABCC examination of Hiroshima victim
The Japanese physicians and scientists who’d
been on the scene told horrific stories of people
who’d  seemed  unharmed,  but  then  began
bleeding  from  ears,  nose,  and  throat,  hair
falling  out  by  the  handful,  bluish  spots
appearing  on  the  skin,  muscles  contracting,
leaving limbs and hands deformed. When they
tried to publish their observations, they were
ordered  to  hand  over  their  reports  to   US
authorities.  Throughout  the  occupation  years
(1945-52)  Japanese  medical  journals  were
heavily  censored on nuclear  matters.  In  late
1945,  US Army surgeons issued a statement
that  all  people  expected  to  die  from  the
radiation effects of the bomb had already died
and  no  further  physiological  effects  due  to
radiation  were  expected.6  When  Tokyo  radio
announced that even people who entered the
cities  after  the  bombings  were  dying  of
mysterious causes and decried the weapons as
“illegal”  and  “inhumane,”  American  officials
dismissed  these  allegations  as  Japanese
propaganda.7
The  issue  of  radiat ion  poisoning  was
particularly sensitive, since it carried a taint of
banned weaponry, like poison gas. The A-bomb
was  not  “an  inhumane  weapon,”  declared
General  Leslie  Groves,  who  had  headed  the
Manhattan project.8 The first western scientists
allowed in to the devastated cities were under
military escort, ordered in by Groves. The first
western journalists  allowed in  were similarly
under  military  escort.   Australian  journalist
Wilfred Burchett,  who managed to  get  in  to
Hiroshima on  his  own,  got  a  story  out  to  a
British  paper,  describing  people  who  were
dying  “mysteriously  and  horribly”  from  “an
unknown something which I can only describe
as the atomic plague… dying at the rate of 100
a day,” General MacArthur ordered him out of
Japan; his camera, with film shot in Hiroshima,
mysteriously disappeared.9
“No  Radioactivity  in  Hiroshima  Ruin,”
proclaimed a New York Times headline, Sept
13,  1945.  “Survey  Rules  out  Nagasaki
Dangers ,”  s tated  another  headl ine:
“Radioactivity after atomic bomb is only 1000th
of  that  from  luminous  dial  watch,”  Oct  7,
1945.10 There were powerful political incentives
to  downplay  radiat ion  r isk.  As  State
Department Attorney William H. Taft asserted,
the  “mistaken  impression”  that  low-level
radiation is hazardous has the “potential to be
seriously  damaging  to  every  aspect  of  the
Department of Defense’s nuclear weapons and
nuclear propulsion programs…it could impact
the civilian nuclear industry… and it could raise
questions  regarding  the  use  of  radioactive
substances  in  medical  diagnosis  and
treatment.”11  A pamphlet issued by the Atomic
Energy Commission in 1953 “insisted that low-
level exposure to radiation ‘can be continued
indefinitely  without  any  detectable  bodily
change.’”12 The AEC was paying the salaries of
the  ABCC  scientists  and  monitoring  them
“closely—some felt  too closely,” writes Susan
Lindee  in  Suffering  Made  Real,  which
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documents the political pressures that shaped
radiation science.13 (Other good sources on the
making of this science are Sue Rabbit Roff’s
Hotspots,  Monica  Braw’s  The  Atomic  Bomb
Suppressed,  and  Robert  Lifton  and  Greg
Mitchell’s,  Hiroshima  in  America).  The  New
York  Times  “joined  the  government  in
suppressing  information  on  the  radiation
sickness  of  survivors”  and  consistently
downplayed  or  omitted  radioactivity  from its
reportage,  as  Beverly  Ann  Deepe  Keever
demonstrates in The New York Times and the
Bomb.14  Keever,  a  veteran  journalist  herself,
writes that “from the dawn of the atomic-bomb
age,…the Times almost single-handedly shaped
the news of  this epoch and helped birth the
acceptance of the most destructive force ever
created,”  aiding  the  “Cold  War  cover-up”  in
minimizing  and  denying  the  health  and
environmental consequences of the a-bomb and
its testing.
The  Atomic  Bomb  Casualty  Commission
scientists  calculated  that  by  1950,  when the
commission began its investigations, the death
rate  from  all  causes  except  cancer  had
returned  to  “normal”  and  the  cancer  deaths
were too few to cause alarm.15
*******
“It’s  nonsense,  it’s  rubbish!”  protested
epidemiologist  Dr.  Alice  Stewart,  an  early
critic—and victim—of the Hiroshima studies.16
Stewart  discovered,  in  1956,  that  x-raying
pregnant  women  doubled  the  chance  of  a
childhood cancer:  this  put  her on a collision
course with ABCC/RERF data, which found no
excess of cancer in children exposed in utero to
the blasts. Nobody in the 1950s wanted to hear
that a fraction of the radiation dose “known” to
be safe could kill a child. During the Cold War,
officials were assuring us we could survive all-
out nuclear war by ducking and covering under
desks and the U.S. and U.K. governments were
pouring  lavish  subsidies  into  “the  friendly
atom.” Stewart was defunded and defamed.  
Alice Stewart
She persisted in her criticisms of the Hiroshima
data  which  were  repeatedly  invoked  to
discredit her findings, pointing out that there
was no way the survivors could have returned
to “normal” a mere five years after the atomic
blasts. This was not a normal or representative
population:  it  was  a  population  of  healthy
survivors, since the weakest had died off. Her
studies  of  childhood  cancer  had  found  that
children incubating cancer became 300 times
more infection sensitive than normal children.
Children  so  immune-compromised  would  not
have survived the harsh winters that followed
the  bombings,  when  food  and  water  were
contaminated,  medical  services  ground  to  a
halt,  and  antibiotics  were  scarce—but  their
deaths  would  not  have  been  recorded  as
radiation-related cancer deaths. Nor would the
numerous  stillbirths,  spontaneous  abortions,
and miscarriages  (known effects  of  radiation
exposure)  have  been  so  recorded.  Stewart
maintained that were many more deaths from
radiation  exposure  than  official  figures
indicated.
Besides, the survivors had been exposed to a
single, external blast of radiation, often at very
high dose (depending on their  distance from
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the bombs),  rather than the long,  slow,  low-
dose exposure that  is  experienced by people
living near reactors or workers in the nuclear
industry.  Stewart’s  studies  of  the  Hanford
nuclear  workers  were  turning  up  cancer  at
doses “known to be too low” to produce cancer,
too low as defined by the Hiroshima data: “This
is the population you ought to be studying to
find out the effects of low-dose radiation,” she
maintained, not only because the workers have
been subjected to the kind of exposure more
likely  to  be  experienced  by  downwinders  to
reactors  and  accidents,  but  also  because
records  were  kept  of  their  exposures  (the
nuclear industry requires such records). 
Worker with radioactive waste at Hanford
In  the  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki  studies,  by
contrast radiation exposure was estimated on
the  flimsiest  of  guesswork.  The  radiation
emitted by the bombs was calculated according
to tests  done in the Nevada desert  and was
recalculated  several  times  in  subsequent
decades. Researchers asked such questions as,
where  were  you  standing  in  relation  to  the
blast, what was between you and it, what had
you had for breakfast that morning, assuming
that the survivors would give reliable accounts
five years after the event. 
“Bible  arithmetic!”  Stewart  called  the
Hiroshima  data:  “it  has  skewed  subsequent
calculations  about  the  cancer  effect  of
radiation, and not only the cancer effect, but
many other effects  –immune system damage,
lowered resistance to disease, infection, heart
disease,  genetic  damage.  These  are  serious
misrepresentations  because  they  suggest  it’s
safe  to  increase  levels  of  background
radiation.”  In  fact,  as  the  Hiroshima studies
went  on,  they turned up numerous radiation
effects  besides  cancer17—cardiovascular  and
gastrointestinal  damage,  eye  diseases,  and
other  health  problems—which  bore  out  her
prediction.  Stewart was also proved right on
the issue of fetal X-rays, though it took her two
decades  to  convince  official  bodies  to
recommend against the practice, during which
time doctors went right on X-raying pregnant
women.  It  took  her  another  two  decades  to
build a case strong enough to persuade the US
government, in 1999, to grant compensation to
nuclear  workers  for  cancer  incurred  on  the
job.18 (It helps, in this area, to be long-lived, as
she commented wryly).
Twice,  she  has  demonstrated  that  radiation
exposures assumed “too low” to be dangerous
carry  high  risk—two  major  blows  at  the
Hiroshima data. Yet this 60-year old RERF data
set  continues  to  be  invoked  to  dismiss  new
evidence—evidence  of  cancer  clusters  in  the
vicinity of nuclear reactors and findings from
Chernobyl.
*******
More than 40 studies have turned up clusters
of childhood leukemia in the vicinity of nuclear
facilities,  reckons Ian Fairlie,  an independent
consultant on radioactivity in the environment
and  a  former  member  of  the  Committee
Examining Radiation Risks of Internal Emitters
(an investigatory commission established by the
U.K.  government  but  disbanded  in  2004).
Fairlie describes this as a “mass of evidence
difficult to contradict”19—yet it continues to be
contradicted,  on  the  basis  of  the  Hiroshima
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studies.  Generally  when  a  cancer  cluster  is
detected in the neighborhood of a reactor, the
matter  gets  referred  to  a  government
committee that dismisses the findings on the
grounds  that  radioactive  emissions  from
facilities  are  “too  low”  to  produce  a  cancer
effect—“too  low,  according  to  RERF  risk
estimates.20
But  in  2007,  something  extraordinary
happened,  when  a  government-appointed
committee formed in response to the pressure
of concerned citizens turned up increased rates
of childhood leukemia in the vicinity of all 16
nuclear  power  plants  in  Germany.  The
Kinderk rebs  i n  de r  Umgebung  von
Kernkraftwerken study, known by its acronym
KiKK, was a large, well-designed study with a
case-control  format  (1592  cancer  cases  and
4735  controls).  The  investigators—who  were
not  opposed  to  nuclear  power—anticipated
they’d find “no effect... on the basis of the usual
models  for  the  effects  of  low  levels  of
radiation.”21 But they found, to their surprise,
that children who lived less than 5 km from a
plant were more than twice as likely to develop
leukemia as children who lived more than 5 km
away.  This  was  inexplicable  within  current
models of estimating radiation risk:22 emissions
would  have  had  to  have  been  orders  of
magnitude higher than those released by the
power  stations  to  account  for  the  rise  in
leukemia. So the investigators concluded that
the rise in leukemia couldn’t have been caused
by radiation.
The  findings  are  not  inexplicable,  explains
Fairlie, when you understand that the data on
which risk is calculated, the Hiroshima studies,
are  “unsatisfactory.”23  Fairlie’s  criticism  of
these  data  echoes  Stewart’s:  “risk  estimates
from an instantaneous external  blast  of  high
energy neutrons and gamma rays are not really
applicable  to  the  chronic,  slow,  internal
exposures from the low-range alpha and beta
radiation from most environmental releases.”24
(my  emphasis)  Fairlie  points  out  a  further
problem with the Hiroshima data: its failure to
take  into  account  the  dangers  of  internal
radiation. As Sawada Shoji, emeritus professor
of  physics  at  Nagoya  University  and  a
Hiroshima  survivor,  confirms,  the  Hiroshima
studies never looked at fallout: they looked at
“gamma rays  and neutrons  emitted  within  a
minute of the explosion,” but did not consider
the  effects  of  residual  radiation  over  time,
effects from inhalation or ingestion that “are
more  severe.”25  The  distinction  between
external and internal radiation is important to
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keep clear. A bomb blast gives off radiation in
the  form  of  high-energy  subatomic  particles
and materials that remain as fallout in the form
of radioactive elements such as strontium 90
and cesium. Most of this is likely to remain on
the ground, where it will radiate the body from
without, but some may be ingested or inhaled
and lodge in a lung or other organ, where it will
continue to emit radioactivity at close range.
Nuclear proponents cite background radiation
to argue that  low-dose radiation is  relatively
harmless, asserting (as Monbiot argued against
Caldicott)  that  we’re  daily  exposed  to
background  radiation  and  survive.  But  this
argument  misses  the  fact  that  background
radiation is from an external source and so is a
more  finite  exposure  than  radioactive
substances ingested or  inhaled,  which go on
irradiating tissues, “giving very high doses to
small  volumes  of  cells,”  as  Helen  Caldicott
says. (Caldicott explains, when physicists talk
about “permissible doses,” “[t]hey consistently
ignore internal emitters — radioactive elements
from nuclear  power  plants  or  weapons  tests
that are ingested or inhaled into the body,…
They focus instead on generally less harmful
external  radiation  from  sources  outside  the
body.”26)
The KiKK study “commands attention,” Fairlie
insists.27 But it got no mention in mainstream
media  in  the  U.S.  or  the  U.K.—until  The
Guardian, in early May of 2011, gave this spin
to  it:  “Plants  have  been  cleared  of  causing
childhood  cancers,”  declared  the  headline.28
“Government’s  advisory  committee  says  it  is
time to look elsewhere for causes of leukaemia
clusters.” What “elsewhere,” what other causes
are cited for cancer clusters in the vicinity of
reactors?  Infection,  a  virus,  a  mosquito,
socioeconomics, chance say the experts quoted
in The Guardian.  The U.K. government is now
moving ahead with plans to  build  eight  new
reactors.
When new evidence comes into conflict  with
old models, reinvoke the old models rather than
looking at the new evidence. The world is flat.
So is it flat in Chernobyl.
*******
“There is no evidence of a major public health
impact attributable to radiation exposure two
decades  after  the  accident  at  Chernobyl,”
announced the New York Times,  a  few days
after  the  Fukushima  reactors  began  to
destabilize (Denise Grady, “Precautions should
limit  health  problems  from  nuclear  plant’s
radiation,” March 15, 2011) The Times bases
this claim on a 2005 World Health Organization
(WHO)  study  that  found  “minimal  health
effects” and estimated that only 4000 deaths
“will probably be attributable to the accident
ultimately.” The worst effect of the accident is
a  “paralyzing  fatalism,”  an  expert  tells  the
Times, which leads people to “drug and alcohol
use, and unprotected sex and unemployment”
(Elisabeth  Rosenthal,  “Experts  find  reduced
effects  of  Chernobyl ,”Sept  6,  2005).
 “Radiophobia,”  this  is  called—an  attitude
problem.
The  T imes  d id  not  ment ion  that  the
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA),
which  is  mandated  with  the  promotion  of
nuclear energy, has an agreement with WHO
that gives it final say over what it reports, an
entangl ing  al l iance  much  decried  by
independent scientists.29 Nor did it mention two
other  studies  that  came  out  in  2006,  “The
Other  Report  on  Chernobyl”  and  “The
Chernobyl  Catastrophe” by Greenpeace,  both
of which gave much higher casualty estimates
than the widely publicized WHO/IAEA report.30
No r  d i d  i t  b r e a t h e  a  w o r d  a b o u t
Chernobyl:  Consequences  of  the  Catastrophe
for  People  and  the  Environment,  by  Alexey
Yablokov  et  al.,  translated  into  English  and
published  by  the  New  York  Academy  of
Sciences in 2009—which estimates casualties
at 985,000, orders of magnitude more than the
WHO/IAEA report.31 
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Yablokov  et  al.  draw on  “data  generated  by
many  thousands  of  scientists,  doctors,  and
other  experts  who  directly  observed  the
suffering  of  millions  affected  by  radioactive
fallout in Belarus,  Ukraine,  and Russia,”  and
incorporate more than 5000 studies, mostly in
Slavic  languages  (compared  with  the  350
mentioned in the 2005 report, most of which
were in English). The authors are impeccably
credentialed:  Dr.  Alexey  Yablokov  was
environmental  advisor  to  Yeltsin  and
Gorbachev; Dr. Vassily Nesterenko was former
director of the Institute of Nuclear Energy in
Belarus.  Nesterenko,  together  with  Andrei
Sakharov, founded the independent Belarusian
Institute  of  Radiation  Safety  BELRAD,  which
studies  –as  well  as  treats—the  Chernobyl
children. When he died in 2008 as a result of
radiation  exposure  incurred  flying  over  the
burning  reactor  (which  gave  us  the  only
measurement of radionuclides released by the
accident), his son Dr. Alexey Nesterenko, third
author of this study, took over as director and
senior  scientist  at  BELRAD.  Dr.  Janette
Sherman, consulting editor, is a physician and
toxicologist. 
Comparing  contaminated  areas  of  Belarus,
Ukraine, and Russia with the so-called “clean
areas,”  the  studies  document  significant
increases  in  morbidity  and  mortality  in
contaminated regions:  not  only  more cancer,
especially thyroid cancer, but a wide array of
noncancer effects — ulcers, chronic pulmonary
diseases,  diabetes  mellitus,  eye  problems,
severe  mental  retardation in  children,  and a
higher  incidence  and  greater  severity  of
infectious and viral diseases. Every system in
the body is adversely affected: cardiovascular,
reproductive,  neurological,  hormonal,
respiratory,  gastrointestinal,  musculoskeletal,
and  immune  systems.  The  children  are  not
thriving:   “Prior  to  1985  more  than  80% of
children in the Chernobyl territories of Belarus,
Ukraine,  and European Russia  were  healthy;
today fewer than 20% are well.”  In animals,
too,  there  are  “significant  increases  in
morbidity and mortality… increased occurrence
of  tumor  and  immunodeficiencies,  decreased
life expectancy, early aging, changes in blood
and the circulatory system, malformations.”  
After Chernobyl
 Photo by Paul Fusco
Parallels between Chernobyl and Hiroshima are
striking:  data  collection  was  delayed,
information  withheld,  reports  of  on-the-spot
observers  were  discounted,  independent
scientists  were  denied  access  “The  USSR
authorities  officially  forbade  doctors  from
connecting diseases with radiation and, like the
Japanese experience, all data were classified.”
With  the  “liquidators,”  as  they’re  called,  the
830,000 men and women conscripted from all
over  the  Soviet  Union  to  put  out  the  fire,
deactivate the reactor, and clean up the sites,
“It  was  officially  forbidden  to  associate  the
diseases  they  were  suffering  from  with
radiation.” “The official secrecy that the USSR
imposed on Chernobyl’s public health data the
first days after the meltdown… continued for
more  than  three  years,”  during  which  time
“secrecy was the norm not only in the USSR,
but in other countries as well.”
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But the parallels are political, not biological, for
the  Hiroshima  data  have  proven  to  be  an
“outdated” and useless model, as Stewart said,
for  predicting  health  effects  from  low-dose,
chronic  radiation  exposure  over  time.  The
Hiroshima studies find little genetic damage in
the survivors, yet Yablokov et al. document that
“Wherever  there  was  Chernobyl  radioactive
contamination,  there  was  an  increase  in  the
number of children with hereditary anomalies
and congenital malformations. These included
previously rare multiple structural impairments
of the limbs, head, and body,” devastating birth
defects,  especially  in  the  children  of  the
liquidators.  The  correlation  with  radioactive
exposure is so pronounced as to be “no longer
an  assumption,  but…proven,”  write  the
authors.  As  in  humans,  so  in  every  species
studied,  “gene  pools  of  living  creatures  are
actively  transforming,  with  unpredictable
consequences”:  “It  appears  that  [Chernobyl’s
irradiation]  has  awakened  genes  that  have
been silent over a long evolutionary time.” The
damage  will  play  out  for  generations  — “at
least seven generations.”
Chernobyl legacy
Photo by Paul Fusco
Such findings have provided radiation experts a
chance  to  reexamine  their  hypotheses  and
theories  about  radiation  effects,  observes
Mikhail  Malko,  a  researcher  at  the  Joint
Institute  of  Power  and  Nuclear  Research  in
Belarus.32 But rather than using new evidence
to  enlarge their  understanding,  experts  have
found  ways  of  dismissing  these  studies  as
“unscientific”: they are said to be observational
rather  than  properly  controlled,  “Eastern
European”  and  not  up  to  Western  scientific
protocols, and inconsistent with the hallowed
Hiroshima  data.  Radiation  scientists  denied
that  the  thyroid  cancer  that  increased
exponentially  after  the  accident  could  be  a
consequence of radiation: it manifested in only
three years, whereas it had taken ten years to
appear  in  Hiroshima,  and  it  took  a  more
aggressive form. They explained the increase in
terms of improved screening, iodine substances
used to treat the children, or pesticides—even
though epidemiological studies kept turning up
a link with radiation contamination. Finally in
2005, a case-control study headed by Elisabeth
Cardis confirmed a dose-response relationship
between  radiation  and  thyroid  cancer  in
c h i l d r e n  i n  t e rm s  t h a t  h a d  t o  b e
acknowledged. 3 3
Chernobyl does not usually provide the kind of
neat  laboratory  conditions  that  allow  such
precise dose-response calculations. But neither
did Hiroshima,  where radiation exposure was
guesstimated  years  after  the  fact  and
recalculated  several  times  according  to  new
findings.  Yet  scientists  have  accepted  the
Hiroshima uncertainties –all too readily— and
have allowed this data to shape policy affecting
all life on this planet, while citing the less-than-
ideal conditions for studying Chernobyl as an
excuse  to  ignore  or  discredit  these  findings,
dismissing  them according  to  a  model  more
questionable than the data they’re discounting.
The Chernobyl effects demonstrate that “Even
the smallest  excess of  radiation over that  of
natural background will statistically…affect the
health  of  exposed  individuals  or  their
descendants,  sooner  or  later.”  But  as  with
Stewart’s  findings  about  fetal  x-rays  and
nuclear workers, as with the studies that turn
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up  cancer  clusters  around  reactors,  so  with
Chernobyl  —  it  can’t  be  radiation  that’s
producing these effects because the Hiroshima
studies say it  can’t.  As independent scientist
Rudi  Nussbaum  points  out,  the  “dissonance
between  evidence  and  existing  assumptions
about… radiation risk,” the gap between new
information  and  the  “widely  adopted
presuppositions about radiation health effects,”
has become insupportable.34
Chernobyl  is  a  better  predictor  of  the
Fukushima consequences than Hiroshima, but
we wouldn’t know that from mainstream media.
Perhaps we would rather not know that 57% of
Chernobyl  contamination  went  outside  the
former  USSR;  that  people  as  far  away  as
Oregon  were  warned  not  to  drink  rainwater
“for some time”; that thyroid cancer doubled in
Connecticut  in  the  six  years  following  the
accident;  that  369  farms  in  Great  Britain
remained  contaminated  23  years  after  the
catastrophe;  that  the  German  government
compensates  hunters  for  wild  boar  meat  too
contaminated to be eaten35 – and it paid four
times more  in compensation in 2009 than in
2007.  Perhaps  we’d  rather  not  consider  the
possibility  that  “the  Chernobyl  cancer  toll  is
one  of  the  soundest  reasons  for  the  ‘cancer
epidemic’  that has been afflicting humankind
since the end of the 20th century.”
“This  information must  be made available to
the world,” write Yablokov et al. But their book
has met “mostly with silence,” as he said in a
press conference in Washington DC, March 15,
2011.36  The silence of mainstream media has
stonewalled  information  about  Chernobyl’s
health  effects  as  effectively  as  the  Soviets’
blackout concealed the accident itself, and as
the Allies’ censorship hid the health effects of
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.
*******
“We  need  to  quash  any  stories  trying  to
compare  this  [Fukushima]  to  Chernobyl,”
“otherwise it could have adverse consequences
on the market.” “’This has the potential to set
the nuclear industry back globally…We really
need to show the safety of nuclear,” that “it’s
not as bad as it looks.” These statements were
made in a few of the more than 80 emails which
the  Guardian  got  access  to,  which  were  not
intended  for  the  publ ic  eye.  “Brit ish
government  officials  approached  nuclear
companies  to  draw up  a  co-ordinated  public
relations strategy to play down the Fukushima
nuclear  accident  just  two  days  after  the
earthquake  and  tsunami,”  reports  the
Guardian, “to try to ensure the accident did not
derail  their  plans  for  a  new  generation  of
nuclear stations in the UK.”37
Comparisons  with  Chernobyl  have  been
conspicuously absent from mainstream media,
even when Fukushima was upgraded, in early
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June, to a level on a par with Chernobyl, level
7, the highest. Even when Arnold Gundersen, a
nuclear engineer turned whistleblower who has
been  monitoring  Fukushima  from  the  start,
asserted  that  this  accident  may  actually  be
more  dire  than  Chernobyl.  Gundersen,  an
informed,  level-headed  commentator  who
inspires confidence, points out that there are
four  damaged  reactors  leaking  into  the
atmosphere,  ocean,  and  ground  in  an  area
more  populated  than  the  Ukraine:  “You
probably  have  the  equivalent  of  20  nuclear
reactor cores…that is 20 times the potential to
be released than Chernobyl.” (Fairewinds, June
16,  2011). But apart from the damage control
piece it published March 15 (cited above) and
Helen  Caldicott’s  passing  reference  to
“research by scientists in Eastern Europe” (op-
ed,  “After  Fukushima:  Enough  is  enough,”
December 2)—the Times has barely mentioned
Chernobyl (and even Caldicott did not mention
the Yablokov study by name). What Chernobyl
has wrought, which has been documented so
clearly  by  Yablokov  et  al.,  is  simply  too
dangerous to give press to, undercutting as it
does the nuclear industry’s claims to safety and
viability.
*******
The New York Times has done good reporting
on  Japanese  blunders  and  corruption.  It  has
described  the  way  plant  operators  and
government officials minimized the severity of
the meltdown, the corporate and government
cover-ups  and  irresponsibility  (Norimitsu
Onishi and Martin Fackler, “Japan held nuclear
data,  leaving  evacuees  in  peril,”  August  8,
2011).  It  has pointed out complicity between
industry and regulators (Norimitsu Onishi and
Ken  Belson,  “Culture  of  Complicity  Tied  to
Stricken Nuclear Plant,” April 27, 2011). It has
done pieces on citizens’ opposition (Onishi and
Fackler,  “Japan  ignored  or  long  hid  nuclear
risks,” May 17, 2011; Ken Belson, “Two voices
are heard after years of  futility”,  August 19,
2011) and on grass-roots initiatives to gather
data where bureaucrats failed (Hiroko Tabuchi,
“Citizens’ testing finds 20 radioactive hot spots
around  Tokyo,”  Aug  1,  2011).  Tabuchi  even
takes  a  swipe  at  the  “tameness  of  Japanese
mainstream  media,”  which  is  commendable,
though her statement is a model of “tameness”
compared to Nicola Liscutin’s denunciation of
Japanese mass media as “little more than the
mouthpiece of the government and TEPCO.”38
 Human interest stories abound in the Times,
as in other major media, stories of workers sent
in to quiet the reactors, of people living in the
vicinity of the reactors. In one such piece, “Life
in  limbo  for  Japanese  near  damage  nuclear
plant,”  May  2,  2011,  Fackler  and  Matthew
Wald refer to “a lack of hard data about the
health  effects  of  lower  radiation  doses
delivered  over  extended  periods”  –  a  “lack”
that’s  assured,  as  we’ve  seen,  by  the
stonewalling of evidence endemic in the media.
As laudable as some of the Times coverage has
been,  what  it  targets  is  the  ineptitude  and
corruption  of  the  Japanese,  what  happened
over there as opposed to what goes on here,
where our own dirty linen remains unwashed,
as it were, and out of sight. How much easier to
criticize  the  lax  regulatory  mechanisms  and
lack of transparency of the Japanese than to
shine a light on ourselves, on the insidious but
largely invisible working of the nuclear lobby
and lobbyists in this country, on the complicity
of  our  own government  and  media  with  the
nuclear industry.
A  fascinating  expose  by  Norimitsu  Onishi,
“Safety myth left Japan ripe for nuclear crisis”
(June 25, 2011), invites comment along these
lines.  Onishi  investigates  the  “elaborate
advertising campaigns” led by Tepco and the
Ministry of Economy to convince the public of
the  safety  of  nuclear  power.  Hundreds  of
millions of dollars were spent to rally support:
“Over  several  decades,  Japan’s  nuclear
establishment  has  devoted  vast  resources  to
persuade the Japanese public of the safety and
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necessity  of  nuclear  power.  Plant  operators
built  lavish,  fantasy-filled  public  relations
buildings that became tourist  attractions.” In
one of these, “Alice discovers the wonders of
nuclear power. The Caterpillar reassures Alice
about radiation and the Cheshire Cat helps her
learn about the energy source”.  
Lest we feel smug, recall the promotion of “the
friendly atom” by Walt Disney’s book and film,
Our  Friend  the  Atom,  read  and  viewed  by
millions of schoolchildren (when they weren’t
doing “duck and cover” drills).
What Onishi describes as happening in Japan
happened in the U.S. as well— perhaps Onishi
means  to  evoke  such  resonances— where  a
powerful propaganda campaign was launched,
with hundreds of millions of dollars behind it,
to promote “Atoms for Peace,” the new energy
source “too cheap to meter” (though there was
nothing “cheap” about it: it required enormous
government  subsidies,  and  still  does).   This
propaganda machine is described in the 1982
study  Nukespeak:  The  Selling  of  Nuclear
Technology  in  America:  “Beginning  in  the
mid-1950s, the AEC conducted a huge public
relations  operation  to  promote  the  vision  of
Atoms for Peace,” using “a wide range of PR
techniques,  including  films,  brochures,  TV,
radio,  nuclear  science  fairs,  public  speakers,
t r ave l i ng  exh ib i t s ,  and  c l a s s room
demonstrations”  (traveling  AEC exhibits  with
names  like  “Power  Unlimited,”  “Fallout  in
Perspective,” and “The Useful Atom”).39
“Millions of kits of atomic energy information
literature were distributed to elementary, high
school,  and  college  students.”  The  public
relations departments of reactor manufacturers
such  as  Westinghouse  and  General  Electric
were also mobilized to prepare communities for
nuclear  facilities  coming  soon  to  their
neighborhoods  and  to  prime  the  general
population to welcome the new technology. The
connection  with  mainstream  media  could
hardly  be  more  direct,  since  “Westinghouse
owned  CBS  for  many  years,  and  General
Electric, NBC,” as Karl Grossman points out.40
 This  same PR apparatus  has  been busy,  in
recent  decades,  conjuring  the  “nuclear
renaissance”  from  the  ashes  of  Chernobyl,
selling  nuclear  power  as  “clean,  green,  and
safe.”
The Times coverage of Fukushima has raised
hopes  in  some  quarters  that  this  current
disaster may have opened a space for public
debate  in  mainstream  media  about  nuclear
power. But how real is this debate, when so
many fundamental issues remain hidden? How
open a discussion can this be, when Chernobyl
and the German reactor study go unmentioned,
when we have to turn to alternative media to
learn that the Yablokov study even exists—or to
learn  that,  as  Alexander  Cockburn  reports,41
Obama was the recipient of generous campaign
contributions from the nuclear industry (which
may cast some light on his enthusiastic support
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of nuclear power)? How open a discussion is
this,  when  the  ABCC/RERF  radiation  risk
assessments that enable the industry to exist
remain unaddressed? A serious consideration
of the Yablokov study and the German reactor
study would reveal them to be “skewed” and
useless, as we’ve seen; but rather than go this
route, the Times calls on RERF experts to do
damage  control  for  the  industry.  So  RERF
reassurances  about  radiation  risk  remain
unchallenged  and  in  place  as  the  invisible
buttressing of the nuclear industry, as the basis
of  radiation  safety  standards  throughout  the
world.
Contrast  the  response  of  U.S.  media  to  the
response  of  the  German  press:  “Fukushima
marks  the  end of  the  nuclear  era”  (Spiegel,
March  14,  2011);  “Germany  can  no  longer
pretend  nuclear  power  is  safe….  it  is  over.
Done. Finished.” (March 14, 2011)  To Spiegel,
Fukushima is a warning that cries out for an
end to nuclear power; to the Times, Fukushima
is a warning that we should build our reactors
more  efficiently  and  regulate  them  more
carefully, rather than cease building them at all
(Editorial, “In the wake of Fukushima,” July 23,
2011).  In  the  months  after  Fukushima,
“Spiegel’s most popular online feature as the
drama unfolded was an evolving digital map of
the ‘radiation plume,’” observes Ralph Martin;42
“the  German electorate  made nuclear  power
their  top  concern—they  made  Fukushima
theirs,”  whereas  “the  reaction  of  American
media…[was  to]  regard  the  events  as  yet
another  story,  without  any  larger  social
ramifications,”  without  much  relevance  to
ourselves. And so nuclear power marches on:
“Alabama nuclear reactor,  partly  built,  to  be
finished,”  Matthew  Wald,  August  19,  2011;
“Two utilities win approval for nuclear power
plants,”  Matthew  Wald,  December  23,  2011
(neither  of  these  is  a  particularly  long  or
noticeable article, and neither is front page).
There has been precious little mention in U.S.
mainstream media of  the plume Spiegel  was
tracing, except to whisk it away as presenting
“no health hazard” (Broad, cited above), though
the  worldwide  fallout  from  Fukushima  has
occasioned  much  discussion  on  the  Web.
Gundersen43  cites  evidence  that  the  early
releases, which were revealed to be more than
double  what  we  were  initially  informed,
contained “hot particles” of cesium, strontium,
uranium, plutonium, cobalt 60 that have turned
up in automobile engine filters, and according
to what’s been detected in air filters, a person
in Tokyo was breathing about ten hot particles
a day through the month of April. A person in
Seattle  was  breathing  about  five,  that  same
month.
*******
Not to worry: “The effects of radiation do not
come to people that are happy and laughing.
They  come to  people  that  are  weak-spirited,
that  brood and fret.”  So says  Dr.  Yamashita
Shunichi,44 who has been assigned to head the
official study of radiation health effects in the
Fukushima population. Yamashita was sent by
the  Japanese  government  from  Nagasaki
University,  where  he  was  part  of  the  RERF
studies, revered for their long experience with
the  A-Bomb  survivors.  Mandated  with
addressing  the  concerns  of  the  citizens  and
correcting  their  misconceptions,  Yamashita
rallies the population with stirring words: “The
name  Fukushima  will  be  widely  known
throughout  the  world…This  is  great!
Fukushima  has  beaten  Hiroshima  and
Nagasaki.  From  now  on,  Fukushima  will
become the world number 1 name. A crisis is
an opportunity. This is the biggest opportunity.
Hey,  Fukushima,  you’ve  become  famous
without  any  efforts.”   
We’re in good hands. 
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